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This paper reviews recent and emerging trends and problems in
 
Technology Assessment. In 1971 I conducted an extensive survey of T.A.
 
activities.1 Today I will update that study by describing what has been
 
occurring in the last two or three years, as I have been able to observe
 
it, and highlight some of the problems and issues which I see determining
 
the future of Technology Assessment.
 
The bill establishing the Congressional Office of Technology
 
Assessment was passed in October 1972. I begin with that Office, because
 
I believe that what happens in and to that Office will be the critical
 
factor in the future of T.A. The Technology Assessment Board, which is the
 
policy-making organ, was appointed in February 1973. As most of you know,
 
the Board consists of six Senators, three from each party, and six Represen­
tatives, again three from each party, and the Director, who is a non-voting
 
member. (This is, I believe, the first time in more than thirty years that
 
what is essentially a Congressional Committee has been established on the
 
basis of party parity.) Senator Edward Kennedy is the first chairman, and
 
will hold office throughout the 93rd Congress. The law provides that the
 
next chairman shall be a Member of the House.
 
The Technology Assessment Advisory Council has also been appointed
 
and consists of ten public members, whose names and affiliations appear on
 
the attached list, along with the comptroller-General and the Director of
 
the Library of Congress.
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Mr. Emilio Daddario, who introduced the first bill to establish
 
the Office in 1966 while a Representative from Connecticut, and thereby
 
initiated the technology assessment movement, was appointed as the Director
 
of the Office. The Associate Director is Daniel De Simone. Mr. De Simone
 
had not been closely associated with technology assessment hitherto by those
 
who had closely followed the developing movement. However, he had been the
 
director of the large study, "A Metric America," while at the National Bureau
 
of Standards, and had since moved to the National Science Foundation's
 
Science and Technology Policy Office.
 
The Metric America study was in fact an assessment of social impacts
 
of conversion to the metric system, relying in large part on public hearings
 
and representation of interests--although the study was not called a techno­
logy assessment. Dan De Simone appears to have done his homework well and
 
to have a good working understanding of technology assessment and what possi­
bilities and pitfalls await the new Office.
 
Those pitfalls are, I believe, real and threatening. When the new OTA
 
was first conceived by Mr. Daddario, he envisioned something like a much
 
smaller GAO or Library of Congress; that is, an entity which would serve
 
the Congress by supplying it with hard, reliable information, but which would
 
be more or less independent of the internal politics of Congress. The new
 
Office, unfortunately, much more closely resembles a joint committee, and
 
thus faces the difficulties of accomplishing its work without appearing to
 
violate the territory and jurisdictions staked out by other committees, of
 
which it must at the same time attempt to serve the needs. A further diffi­
culty and danger is that the present chairman of the T.A. Board is widely
 
:3
 
viewed as a potential presidential aspirant. Without alleging in any way
 
that Mr. Kennedy would attempt to, or would wish to, or would deliberately
 
lend himself to, exploitation of the issues with which the Office must
 
struggle in order to further his own political image, I fear that this
 
potentiality will be another complication as the Office attempts to establish
 
its initial role and record. The organization of the Office will lend itself
 
to this suspicion. The T.A. Board has interpreted the establishing law in
 
such a way that the Board has a small staff of its own, that is, a staff
 
which serves the Board rather than the Director; Senator Kennedy's Science
 
Advisor is the Executive Secretary of that staff.
 
As with any Congressional Committee, OTA will be subjected to
 
pressure as it begins staffing. Mr. Daddario's strategy has been to delay
 
appointment of program managers until after initial program areas and
 
major topics were selected. Whether he will be able to select people with
 
both knowledge of the technological subject areas and in-depth familiarity
 
with technology assessment concepts and methodology, or whether his choices
 
will be constrained by political considerations, we can only wait to see.
 
Those observers who had for months been predicting the first few appointments
 
have so far been surprised every time. Public hearings were scheduled to
 
have been held in January or February to hear testimony from the heads of
 
Executive agencies about their technology assessment programs and plans,
 
but those Hearings did not occur, for reasons which are not clear; they
 
may be held later this spring.
 
When the bill was passed last fall it was not highly controversial,
 
but neither did it evoke great interest in Congress. The bill provides that
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the assessment activities of the OTA may be initiated "upon the request of"
 
the chairman of any Congressional committee, acting for himself, for the
 
ranking minority member, or for a majority of the members of the committee;
 
or may be initiated by the T.A. Board or by the Director in consultation
 
with the Board. The fact is that most committee chairmen have little or no
 
understanding of what technology assessment is, or what the Office could do.
 
Their temptation will be either to try to use the OTA as a quick response
 
information service to augment their own staff, or to play secrecy games
 
and resent any "intrusion" of OTA into their territory. Mr. Daddario has
 
been diligently calling on committee chairmen to educate them and to solicit
 
their views in an attempt to ward off these dangers.
 
The "Energy Crisis" has generated in some quarters new cynicism about
 
the ability of the government to manage complex technological issues or to
 
prepare for problems which it has been possible to foresee for some time.
 
At the same time, again in some quarters, the energy crisis has fueled a
 
reaction against the environmental movement, or pushed environmental con­
cerns into lower priority. This kind of facile cynicism, however, appears
 
to be less important and will probably be less long-lasting than a much
 
more important effect, a widespread realization that those who raise hard
 
questions about national priorities, conservation of resources, and the
 
necessity of exerting some public control and direction over economic and
 
technological development can no longer be safely ignored or brushed away.
 
This change in attitude may in the long-run cause the OTA to be treated
 
with more seriousness than would otherwise have been the case, and if OTA
 
can, in its first year or two, produce studies of demonstrable excellence,
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insight, and value it will establish a credibility and influence that can
 
make it a major innovation in the American governmental system. Certainly,
 
although the Office itself lacks the usual levers of power hitherto con­
sidered absolutely necessary in Congress, it has leadership of great integrity,
 
knowledge, and influence in its Board and in the Directorships and it is,
 
above all, in the right place, at the right time in history.
 
The first task the Office has accomplished is to select six areas
 
of emphasis for their first year ($2 million is to be committed before
 
July 1, 1974). Obviously the OTA had some obvious criteria--they presumably
 
wanted to fund technology assessments in areas which were important in terms
 
of potential impacts, areas in which Congress must in the near future make
 
decisions (but areas in which the major decisions for the next five to ten
 
years have not already been made, or will not have been made before an
 
assessment could be completed). One would also suppose that OTA would wish
 
to choose areas in which its assessments might have a strong influence and
 
the Office thereby establish prestige and credibility. OTA did make use of
 
four NSF-funded studies of T.A. priorities.
 
The six areas chosen for technology assessments are: technologies
 
related to food, energy, materials resources, oceans, bioequivalence of
 
drugs, and international trade. Now Mr. Daddario, Mr. De Simone, and their
 
(so far very small) staff will begin the task of problem and program
 
definition within those six general subject areas.
 
There are a number of ways OTA may go, and a number of obvious mis­
takes they may make. If they tie themselves too closely to the immediate
 
needs of the other Congressional committees, they may ask for assessments
 
only of technologies which are already widely used but controversial-­
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such as off-shore oil drilling, pesticides, or strip-mining. It is true
 
that in many such subjects comprehensive assessments are lacking and
 
urgently needed. But too much emphasis on relevance to already obvious
 
decision-making needs may lead them to ignore the decision needs which
 
will arise in the future--that is, to overlook the more speculative and
 
uncertain technological options and possibilities which will then catch
 
us unprepared at some future time. OTA will then be trapped in the
 
behavior Congress has always exhibited--reacting to today's crisis, solving
 
yesterday's problems, and backing rumpfirst into the future.
 
OTA also runs the risk of concentrating too much on areas which,
 
however important, are chosen because they are now a matter of public
 
concern and thus already are generating action programs. It is unfortunate
 
when action programs are initiated, and continue, without both a urior and
 
an on-goingassessment of their impacts. Nevertheless, to have a strong
 
effect on decision-making, it is too late to begin a comprehensive
 
assessment after a "crisis" is evident and action programs become the
 
order of the day. By then directions have already been chosen--or dictated,
 
political and economic capital has been committed, bureaucracies have been
 
generated, and interests have been mobilized. If only very limited
 
resources can be allocated to assessments,they should be more, not less,
 
anticipatory--to maximize the opportunity to lay a grounding of objective,
 
authoritative information before the subject becomes controversial.
 
The Congressional Office and what happens to it appears to be
 
critical because Executive agencies will take their direction accordingly.
 
To fully appreciate'that, it is necessary to recall how the concept of
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technology assessment originated. The 1960's were a time when the
 
cumulative effects of technological advance burst into public conscious­
ness in the form of alarms over alleged hazards to health and safety from
 
industrial byproducts or unexpected physiological effects of chemicals
 
such as thalidomide. Rapid economic growth and a national prdgram of
 
highway and airport building suddenly intruded into the suburban sanctuary
 
of the affluent middle class, bringing pollution, noise, and competition
 
for residential land. In the cities Black and ethnic communities, newly
 
politicized, began to resist disruption of settled neighborhoods. Court
 
battles resulting in costly delays to projects, and aroused constituent
 
pressure, brought response from Congress--new requirements for planning,
 
community participation, agency coordination, and, above all, demands
 
that Congress be furnished with more comprehensive information. The
 
development of technology assessment as an interdisciplinary, policy­
oriented class of studies was one result. A closely related result
 
was the National Environmental Policy Act and the requirement for
 
environmental impact studies. I found in the survey which I mentioned
 
that executive agencies--reacting to these demands--in the ensuing five­
year period began significantly to broaden the processes by which they
 
plan, program, and evaluate technological projects, although the extent
 
and pace of improvement varied considerably from agency to agency. This
 
improvement is clearly a defensive reaction to Congressional, and ultimately
 
to public, pressure. There has been little or no pressure for better
 
management from the top echelons of the Executive branch and there is not
 
likely to be. Hence the agencies--the only possible source of sustained
 
funding for T.A.--will take their lead from the Congressional OTA and take
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its activities as a model or a challenge.
 
Rumors are circulating widely, and I believe they are well-founded,
 
that the Office of Management and Budget has directed Executive agencies
 
to minimize the direct support they give to OTA. Presumably this is a
 
direct effect of the political problem I have already mentioned, i.e.,
 
the Presidential potentiality of the Chairman of the T.A. Board, although
 
I believe the reason given is that OTA might "raid the research budget"
 
of the agencies. If these rumors are true, the effect may nevertheless
 
be minimal, because the agencies have not only to defend their budgets
 
and programs to OMB but to Congress. In the present situation in
 
Washington, the Executive Office is not able to keep as strong a hand on
 
the bureaucracy as it could a short time ago.
 
In the last two years there have been small but significant signs that
 
some agency officials believed Congressional pressure would continue. From
 
time to time RFP's appear in the Commerce Business Daily with the words
 
"Technology Assessment" in the description and solicitations for evaluative
 
studies commonly use the phrase "including social impacts." The AEC now
 
has at least one employee with the job title "Technology Assessment
 
Specialist." The Federal Highway Administration uses the acronym "SEES"
 
or "social, environmental, economic impact studies." The Department of
 
Commerce has a "Technology Assessment Office" (in fact a misnomer),
 
and most of the agencies have had conferences, seminars, or requested
 
briefings on technology assessment for their staff. This protective
 
reaction, it seems to me, comes almost ,entirely from the middle management
 
echelons where program justification and defense must be prepared, and
 
is resisted or ignored by the upper echelons and the lower operational
 
echelons respectively. In a number of other agencies, there are on-going
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studies which constitute technology assessments. To mention only a few
 
examples: There is the major study proceeding in DOT, Climatic Impacts
 
of Atmospheric Pollution, which has a broader scope and greater depth
 
than its title might suggest. DOT is also studying the impact of
 
alternatives to the internal combustion engine, and the impacts of rail­
road electrification. The Environmental Protection Agency is studying
 
the potential impacts of electric automobiles on the Los Angeles area.
 
The National Science Foundation, chiefly through the Office of Explcratory
 
Research and Problem Assessment within RANN,' is still the only source
 
of sustained funding for comprehensive technology assessment within the
 
Federal government. This is in fact probably the best site for this
 
activity. One of the recommendations which emerged from my study of
 
Federal T.A. was that, while all agencies should be pressed to incorporate
 
T.A. concepts and techniques in their day-to-day planning and evaluative
 
procedures, comprehensive and credible T.A.'s were best sponsored by a
 
source which had no operational responsibility for the programs and
 
projects being assessed, in order to provide a broad scope for potential
 
assessments, reduce institutional bias and maximize public access to
 
the results. NSF had $2.1 million for T.A. in FY '74 and expects to
 
have $2.7 million for FY '75. The range of topics in which NSF has
 
funded technology assessments is broad...
 
- alternatives to the internal combustion engine
 
- solar energy
 
- geothermal energy
 
- off-shore oil and gas exploitation
 
- energy conservation measures
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- weather modification (snowpack augmentation)
 
- integrated hog farming
 
- biopesticides
 
- conversion to the metric system
 
- alternative work schedules
 
- remote sensing
 
- videophone
 
- cable television
 
- electronic banking
 
NSF has also funded some supporting work in T.A.: the survey
 
which I conducted in Federal agencies, the comparative study which Martin
 
Jones has described 2 another survey of technology assessment activity
 
including the state and local and private sector, four studies of priorities
 
for T.A., and several workshops and conferences on technology assessment.
 
There are several additional points to be made here.
 
NSF has apparently decided not to fund further studies of a
 
strictly methodological nature, but to encourage experimentation with
 
a variety of techniques and methods appropriate to the technology being
 
assessed--in other words, to let the configuration of the technology drive
 
the research design.
 
The techniques of technology assessment are considered to be equally
 
appropriate to social technology as well as physical and biological tech­
nology; note that alternative work schedules is a social technology, and
 
that several of the other subjects (the metric system, integration of hog
 
farming) have important elements of both physical and social technology.
 
While none of the areas picked by OTA for its first year is purely
 
a social technology, Mr. Daddario and Mr. De Simone have stated that they
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expect to choose such areas in the future.
 
Nearly every technology assessment which has been done reached
 
a similar conclusion either explicitly or implicitly--namely, that
 
institutional obsolescence, maladjustment, or inadequacy is critical
 
in problems arising from or foreseen for technological development;
 
or that new institutional arrangements must be invented in order to
 
direct or control the direction of development or minimize undesirable
 
side-effects.
 
Even when sponsors of assessments have explicitly directed the
 
performers not to make policy recommendations, such findings seem
 
inexorably to emerge. Some organizations and researchers have refused
 
or resisted the opportunity to carry out the logical final steps in
 
technology assessment considered as support for policy making--that is,
 
to lay out policy and action alternatives and assess their comparative
 
impacts. It is often claimed that such tasks intrude the "values" of the
 
assessor into the decision-making process. But technology assessment is
 
intended to support and inform the decision-making process, and the public
 
cannot be expected to understand, nor the decision-makers to have the time,
 
to penetrate a dense technical report and work out the implications for
 
alternative policies and actions in order to make a wise choice. Either
 
the assessors themselves must draw out and elucidate these alternatives
 
(without intervening in the final decision) or some other entity
 
such as OTA must provide the translation., NSF has recently
 
required that a substantial portion of the funding be allocated to
 
providing a popular version of the technical report which is both accurate
 
and easily readable by the layman, and to providing a plan for popular
 
dissemination of results through publications, filmstrips, broadcast
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media, and open conferences. This is a substantial and significant
 
departure for NSF, which in basic research grants can rely on scholarly
 
publications and peer group interest to get research results to users.
 
An interesting trend has developed in would-be contractors and
 
grantees responding to NSF program announcements and to some extent to
 
competitive solicitations for assessments by other agencies: the formation
 
of consortia of universities, or of universities, non-profit and profit­
oriented research organizations, and industry research and development
 
units. Most organizations cannot within themselves meet the requirements
 
that more and more become apparent as experience with technology assess­
ment accumulates.
 
It is interesting that industry, which has not rushed to perform
 
or sponsor technology assessments of technological developments which it
 
may be pushing, should respond to Federal initiatives. Those companies
 
which have done so usually have a potential interest in the potential
 
technology being assessed, and evidently saw this as an opportunity to
 
perform an assessment and gain valuable information which the corporate
 
structure would not be willing to pay for (and even make a slight
 
profit to sweeten the deal), but also saw it as an opportunity to learn a
 
skill which itmay be necessary to possess in the future. In many cases
 
the industry group chose a University research team as subcontractor or
 
joint participant. In all likelihood the sponsoring agency will get
 
full and valuable return on this investment by tapping into expertise
 
and experience (in thetechnology) which industry has in abundance. The
 
University teams on the other hand have a queasy foreboding that--having
 
absorbed the knowledge and experience the University group has developed
 
in assessment--industry will go it alone the second time around and
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attract the lion's share of future T.A. funding.
 
Technology assessments should (a)be widely interdisciplinary,
 
(b) include or have access to both data from advanced basic research and
 
experiencedapplied, problem-oriented researchers, (c) be free of the taint
 
of or suspicion of institutional bias, (d) be protected from pressure by
 
client, constituents, political activists, (e) be well-managed and coor­
dinated, and (f) be sensitive to the real needs of the ultimate user (who
 
often does not know his needs). To have the desired impact (that is,
 
to be in a position to support and inform decision-making) technology
 
assessments should also have credibility, visibility, and a means of
 
communicating the findings to the public.
 
Interdisciplinary research is and has always been a problem for
 
universities except in extraordinary circumstances. The chief difficulties,
 
as Jack White has pointed out, are the reward structure and the inability
 
of experts in one field to communicate information and insights to experts
 
in other fields, especially where the disciplines differ widely in
 
assumptions, theories, methodology, terminology, and acceptable degree of
 
uncertainty. The reward structure for interdisciplinary studies of the
 
T.A. type is slowly improving. In part this is a result of the emphasis
 
on relevancy during the past decade, but its practical manifestations are
 
the emergence of interdisciplinary journals (offering the opportunity for
 
publication), the development of interdisciplinary degree-granting programs
 
(job-opportunities, promotions, and prestige), a growing opportunity for
 
consultantships for social scientists, experienced "generalists," and applied
 
methodology experts. When, as has been the case with the University of
 
Oklahoma's off-shore oil and gas assessment, the study receives wide
 
attention from Federal agencies and Congress, a new (for academics) reward
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structure comes into play. It is noteworthy that large independent
 
research organizations appear to have theit own difficultieswith
 
interdisciplinary studies, a point not often recognized. Internal
 
organization of any information-oriented bureaucracy (as good a definition
 
of both universities and research organizations as can be found) seems to
 
have an irresistible tendency to harden along disciplinary lines. This
 
probably results from the fact that advanced knowledge and training becomes
 
ever more specialized. There is probably no way to overcome this tendency
 
except by interdisciplinary training, or, more likely, interdisciplinary
 
experience on the part of more scientists. Social scientists are usually
 
poorly educated in natural sciences,even in an understanding of the phykical
 
laws of the world they live in ; physical scientists seem to have two
 
parallel deficiencies: an inability to deal intelligently with uncertainty
 
and low probability, and an inadequate understanding of how people react
 
with, and use and misuse, technology.
 
Universities have an even more serious problem. Theoretically they
 
can draw on a wide range of disciplines, and have an advantage over
 
independent research organizations in that they do not become constricted
 
to those areas well supported by long-term clients, but they almost in­
variably lack management capability. Management of a university inter­
disciplinary research team should not be located within one of the
 
participating departments, but should be outside of the academic structure
 
and supported by a core staff which is not tied to the vagaries of the
 
university teaching calendar; even so, by the nature of the beast, to the
 
extent that it utilizes faculty and students (and is not simply a thihk-tank
 
grafted onto the university) authority and discipline, to impose coherence
 
and deadlines, will still be difficult. The University, on the other hand,
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has some additional advantages for technology assessments--it can provide
 
ready access to basic research at the developing edge of a science or
 
technology; it generally enjoys both the substance and the reputation for
 
objectivity and neutrality; it can exploit trained personnel (graduate
 
students) at outrageously low costs with good conscience since it is
 
offering them a valuable commodity in return, real world experience and
 
a chance to build a track record.
 
The role which public participation should or can play in technology
 
assessment is not yet resolved. (Here I am not raising a question as to
 
the role of public participation in decision-making; that it must and can
 
play such a role is indisputable.) But technology assessment is not
 
decision-making--its function is to provide an objective base of informa­
tion for decision-makers--as nearly complete and neutral as human capability
 
can aspire to. Some argue that public participation is also vital in that
 
step, to ensure that all affected parties and all potential impacts are
 
detected and evaluated. Others would argue against that proposition on
 
the grounds that
 
- "the public " by definition can add nothing to, and lacks 
the specialized knowledge to evaluate, the scientific and
 
technical knowledge that must be brought to bear during
 
the analysis;
 
- public participation converts the analytical process into
 
an adversarial process (or political process) which con­
sists of balancing or weighting obvious interests rather
 
than detecting and tracing unsuspected impacts;
 
- the interests represented will be only short-term and
 
narrow interests; since no one speaks for the community
 
or society as a whole or for the long-term future, such
 
concerns will be outweighed and downgraded;
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- public participation generates and solidifies opposition
 
(or support) too early in the evaluative process, before
 
sufficient data is available;'later information tends not
 
to overcome the political and psychological "investments"­
already made (i.e., minds are difficult to change);
 
- some segments of society can rarely or never be involved
 
in "public" participation; also, assessors may make
 
biased choices of the "public" who are to participate,
 
or may co-opt their support for later implementation.
 
The development of technology assessment, in which the U.S. has
 
led the way, is not a national but a multi-national development. Several
 
international conferences have been held, bringing together those-inter­
ested in technology assessment in both industrial and developing countries.
 
Groups of government, industrial, and academic representatives from western
 
and eastern Europe, Scandinavia, and Japan frequently visit the U.S. to
 
discuss technology assessment. The International Society for Technology
 
Assessment, which held a major conference in The Netherlands last spring,
 
is now planning a more specialized conference in Tokyo in conjunction with
 
the Japan Techno-Economic Society. OECD has an international group
 
actively studying technology assessment. One of the most-promising
 
trends to be noted is the way in which assessors and planners in many
 
countries with different forms of government, legal systems, ideologies,
 
and economies are experimenting with the same techniques and methodologies
 
and grappling with the same problems--such as how to- communicate and make
 
the results of assessment more useful to decision-makers, how-to develop
 
scenarios of the future in which technological impacts will be manifested,
 
and how to deal with and manage the inevitable uncertainties of assessment.
 
What is emerging here is a kind of cooperative effort which transcends
 
language, politics, and ideology in an effort to come to grips with common
 
practical problems.
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I have said that what happens to the U.S. Congressional Office
 
of Technology Assessment is a critical factor in the behavior of Executive
 
Agencies, but I do not mean that it will be the determining factor in the
 
further development of technology assessment. That development, as a
 
practical and useful, albeit only a first and uncertain, approach to
 
dealing with the problems of increasingly complex society, is not only
 
"an idea whose time has come," but an idea which is logically inevitable.
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TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT BOARD 
Republicans 	 Democrats 
Senate 	 CASE (N.J.) KENNEDY (Mass.) 
DOMINICK (Col.) * HOLLINGS (S. Car.) 
SCHWEIKER (Penn.) HUMPHREY (Minn.) 
House MOSHER (Ohio) DAVIS (Ga.)
GUBSER (Calif.) TEAGUE (Tex.)
HARVEY (Mich.) UDALL (Ariz.) 
Senator Stevens of Alaska has been appointed to replace
 
Senator Dominick, who resigned from the Board.
 
ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES - SENATE 
Standing, Special, Select and Joint Committees 
-- -* ------------OFFICE -- -- --- - --DietradSafI -- - -------- -- TECHNOLOGY 
OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT BOARD ASSESSMENT 
TECHNOLOGY I ADVISORY 
ASSESSMENT Director and Staff I CONCIL 
Congressional al 	 General 
Research - Science Accounting 
Service Foundaion Office
 
Contractors, Consultants., Loaned Personnel, etc.
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RESOLUTION ON APPOINTMENT OF
 
TEN PUBLIC MEMBERS TO ADVISORY COUNTIL
 
The Chairman is hereby authorized to effect the appointment of
 
the following ten public-members to the Technology Assessment Advisory
 
Council:
 
Harold Brown President 
California Institute of Technology 
J. Fred Bucy Executive Vice President 
Texas Instruments, Inc. 
Hazel Henderson Author ana lecturer on environmental 
and social issues 
J. M. (Levi) Leathers Executive Vice President 
DOW Chemical Corporation 
John McAlister, Jr. Associate Professor 
Department of Engineering-Economic Systems 
Stanford University 
Eugene P. Odum Director 
Institute of Ecology 
University of Georgia 
Frederick C. Robbins Dean 
Case Western Reserve University 
School of Medicine (Nobel Laureate) 
Edward Wenk, Jr. Professor of Engineering and Public Affairs 
University of Washington 
Gilbert F. White Director 
Institute of Behavioral Science 
University of Colorado 
